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Introduction
In 1999, the Commission commenced investigatory procedures into complaints that the Italian
Government was granting unauthorised state aid to its domestic ferry services operated by various
undertakings or companies within the Tirrenia di Navigazione group.2 Those investigations
culminated in a Decision declaring the measures taken by the Italian Government to be unlawful.3
Pursuant to the Decision, the Commission asked Italy to suspend payment of any aid in excess of
the net additional cost of providing services of general economic interest. Italy refused. Its
government and six companies in the Tirrenia group brought actions in the ECJ and the CFI
respectively seeking the annulment of the Decision.
Theprocedural historyof this case is especially long drawn out for various reasons, but the netresult
was that theCFI suspendedproceedings pending a ruling from the ECJ on the legalityof theDecision.
In the meantime, through protracted negotiations and examination, the Commission decided to
suspend the application of the Decision as regards some of the state aidmeasures in question ^ that
is to say, some of themeasureswere pronounced no longer to be incompatiblewith the proscription
against unlawful state aid. The aid, in relation to certain companies in the group, was found to be
justified on the grounds of compensating the provision of public services. The Decision remained
applicable, however, to two aidmeasures providedby the Italian Government.
Itmight additionallybenoted that theCommission considered the aidnot to bepartof an existing aid
scheme but a new aid; as such, it relied on Article 88(3) instead of Article 88(1) EC in issuing the
1 Judgment of10 May 2005, ECJ.
2 In general, state aidmay only be granted to ships entered in the Member State's register. According to the recent Guidelines on State
aid formaritime transport (OJ 2004C13, p 3 (17 January 2004)), aidmayexceptionallybe granted inrespectof other ships provided: (a)
they comply with the international standards and Community law (including those relating to security, safety, environmental
performance and on-board working conditions); (b) they are operated from the Community, and (c) their shipowner is established in
the Community and the Member State is able to show that the register (elsewhere) contributes directly to the objectives of the
Guidelines (supra n14). Flagging thus is particularly important in the context of state aid for maritime transport.
3 OJ1999 C306 p 2.
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Decision.4 One primary issue of the present case was thus whether the Commission had correctly
classified the aidmeasures as new aid.
Context
There were two types of state aid which the Commission alleged to be in breach of the treaty
provisions:
(a) a tax treatment fromwhich theTirrenia groupbenefited in respectof the fuel and lubricating oils
for its vessels
(b) subsidies paid to compensate theTirrenia group for maritime services the groupwas obliged to
provide to the public.
The Commission recognises that some state aid to maritime transport is necessary, but has always
been concerned that there should be consistency of practice and policy between Member States. In
its Communication of17 January 20045 it published a set of guidelines on how and towhat extent the
granting of state aid to the maritime sector would be tolerated. Preferential fiscal treatment of
shipowning companies by Member States is not a new phenomenon; many Member States have
taken special measures to improve the so-called f`iscal climate' for shipowning companies, including,
for example, accelerated depreciation on investment in ships, or the right to reserve profitsmade on
the sale of ships for a number of years on a tax-free basis, provided that the profits are reinvested in
ships. Such preferential fiscal treatment, especially where it is discriminatory, are generally
incompatible with the spirit of the free movement principles. However, the Commission is not
disinclined to approve the fiscal treatment, given the need for EU flag states to compete with flags
of convenience. There should therefore, as a rule, be a link between the tax relief scheme and a
Community flag. Additionally, any aid provided `must be necessary to promote the repatriation of
the strategic and commercial management of all ships concerned in the Community and, in addition,
that the beneficiaries of the schemesmust be liable to corporate tax in the Community'.6
As far as maritime cabotage is concerned, the Commission has stated that if an international
transport service is necessary to meet imperative public transport needs, Public Services
Obligations (PSOs) may be imposed or Public Service Contracts (PSCs) may be concluded,
provided that any compensation is subject to the provisions of state aid. The duration of such
contracts should necessarily be limited to a reasonable period so as not to result in the creation of a
privatemonopoly.
Procedural arguments
Right to be heard
It is noteworthy that under Article 88(2), there should be an opportunity for the Member State to
inform and, possibly, explain that the measures in question do not constitute state aid or constitute
existing aid.That was indeed the claim of the Italian Government in the present case.The ECJ ruled
that, as regards thatprocedural opportunity, theMember State shouldbe entitled to respond to each
4 Article 88 reads:
`(1) The Commission shall, in cooperationwithMember States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those states. It shall
propose to the latter any appropriatemeasures requiredby the progressive development or by the functioning of the commonmarket.
(2) If after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or through
State resources is not compatible with the commonmarket having regard to Article 87, or that such aid is beingmisused, it shall decide
that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission.
If the State concerned does not comply with the decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other interested Statemay, in
derogation from the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 refer thematter to the Court of Justice direct.
(3) The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers
that any such plan is not compatible with the commonmarket having regard to Article 87, it shall without delay initiate the procedure
provided for in paragraph 2.TheMember State concerned shall notput itsmeasures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final
decision.'
5 Guidelines (n 2); the Guidelines are intended to replace a similar set of guidelines published in1997 (OJ1997 C 205 p 5).
6 ibid para 3.1p 6.
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and every one of the measures in question. A discussion with the Commission generally of the
measures taken collectively was not enough.
The Commission also argued that under Regulation 659/19997 on procedure in state aid cases, in the
case of new aid not notified but implemented,8 the procedure in Article 88(2) did not need to be
preceded by correspondence with the Member State concerned. It contended that although Article
10(2) of that Regulation may indeed allow the Commission to seek information from the State in
advance, that was not a legal obligation. That provision states that the `Commission, if necessary,
shall request information from the Member States concerned'. As far as the ECJ is concerned, that
provision should not be read as releasing the Commission from the obligation to discuss a measure
with the Member State concerned. It merely expresses a reservation regarding cases in which the
Commission has already adequately discussed the measure at issue with the Member State. The
Court considered, for example, i`f it is the [Member State] itself that informed the Commission of
the existence of that measure',9 then the Commission may decide that there was nothing more to
be achieved from a discussion with the Member State concerned. In so holding, the ECJ declined to
imply a stronger element of discretion into the provision, thereby confining the provision to the
position prior to the Regulation.10
As regards the complaint that the Italian Government had given theTirrenia group special tax
advantages, the ECJ found that the Commission had not properly consulted with the Member State
and, as such, the Decisionwas to be annulled to the extent that it entailed the suspension of the tax
treatment to the group for supplies of fuel and lubricating oils for its vessel.
On the subsidies, however, theCourt found that itwas apparent from the correspondence that those
matters were dealt with by both the Commission staff and the Italian authorities. It could not
therefore be claimed that Italy had not been given the opportunity to put its views to the
Commission prior to the Decision being taken. That part of the Decision would therefore not be
annulled on the basis of lack of consultation.
Arelatedquestion, in themaritime context, is towhatextent theGuidelines on State aid tomaritime
transportmightbe relevant to an assessment of theMember State's right to be consulted. Paragraph
12 of the Communication requires Member States to communicate to the Commission, with
reference to all existing or new aid schemes falling within the scope of the Communication, an
assessment of their effects during the sixth year of implementation. It is obvious that the
Commission is keen to shift the responsibility for information collecting to the Member States.The
Communication clearly carries nomandatory legal effect; as such, itwouldbe interesting to see how
the Court would respond to Member States failing to provide such information. How should
paragraph12 of the Communication be read with Article10 of the Regulation on procedure in state
aid cases, in the case of new aid? One guiding principle might be said to be the spirit of cooperation
between Member States and the Commission, as has frequently been alluded to by the ECJ in state
aid cases.On that basis, itmight be suggested that the net effect is that Member States are required
to provide relevant information, but that it is not a right of the Commission to decline to consult.
Misuse ofpowers
Italy also submitted that the Commissionwas guilty ofmisuse of powers.That defence is increasingly
popular, both in competition law and state aid cases, but the Court has been exceedingly careful not
to distend the application of the principle beyond thatwhich, in itsmind, is consistentwith the raison
7 OJ1999 L 83 p1 (22 March1999).
8 The so-called u`nlawful aid'referred to in Ch III of the regulation. Itwas common ground that the ItalianGovernmenthadnot notified
the Commission of the special tax treatment and subsidies conferred on theTirrenia group.
9 Para 30 of the judgment.
10 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I^307; following the Court's decision there, the Commission then adopted a procedure
where theMember Statewouldbewritten to and an explanation of the aidmeasures sought, within 30 days or fewer depending on the
urgency of the case.The Member Statewas given an expectation, if not a right, to be consulted.
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d'eª tre of the Commission's discretionary powers and the objectives of the single market. A decision
would only amount to a misuse of powers i`f it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and
consistent facts, to have been taken for purposes other than those stated'.11 Although evidence of
bad faith is not necessarily sought by the Court, the evidence should be such that some sort of
malfeasance12 or excess of powers is present. In the present case, according to the ECJ, misuse of
powers could only have been established if it could be shown that the Commission had deliberately
classified as new aidmeasures whichwere obviously existing aidmeasures or not state aidmeasures
at all. In the lightof the information available to theCommission at the time theDecisionwas taken, it
could not be said that it was beyond doubt that the subsidies paid to theTirrenia group constituted
existing aid or measures not being state aid at all.13 The question is always one of proof and the
persuasiveness of the evidence. There are no guidelines, but from the facts, it would seem that as
the subsidies given were obviously in excess of the net additional costs lined with the provision of
public services by the beneficiary, theTirrenia group, the Commission could not be said to have
acted inappropriately in its classification of themeasure as a new state aid.
Misuse of powers is a defence principally dependent on the characterisation of the objectives to be
achieved by the Commission. In this regard, it is necessary to observe that the new Guidelines on
State aid tomaritime transport refer to the following objectives:
^ improving a safe, efficient, secure and environment friendlymaritime transport
^ encouraging the flagging or re-flagging to Member States' registers
^ contributing to the consolidation of themaritime cluster in the Member States whilemaintaining
an overall competitive fleet onworldmarkets
^ maintaining and improving maritime know-how and protecting and promoting employment for
European seafarers
^ contributing to short sea shipping.14
In this connection, it is clear that the Commission's objectives extendbeyond the economic to social,
technological and environmental concerns.Thus, given thewide range of objectives the Commission
is entrusted to achieve in the context of State aid for maritime transport, the defence of misuse of
powers is unlikely to succeed.
Newaid or existing aid
The distinction between new aid (that is to say, the grant of an aid not previously there or the
modification of a pre-existing aid) and existing aid is not entirely free from controversy. Take, for
example, the variation of certain tax thresholds in a pre-existing tax regime applicable to maritime
operators.Thatmight at first glance appear to be new aid; but itmight be shown the implications of
the change are not appreciable or that the general scheme remains unchanged, only certain
thresholds have beenmodified. Similarly, in the present case the Italian Government argued that, as
the subsidies had been paid out as compensation for public service contracts, they were governedby
Regulation 3577/92 applying the freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member
States.15 They then relied on Article 4(3) of that Regulation which allows public service contracts
already existing at the date of entry into force of the Regulation to remain in force until their
respective expiry dates. Italy argued that as the subsidies had been paid long before the Maritime
Cabotage Regulationwas in existence (and indeed, in some payments, long before even theTreaty of
Rome was signed), Article 4(3) presumes that the Commission has notice of such measures. It thus
followed that authorisation for those measures may be implied from the Commission's lack of
objection and presumedknowledge.
11 Para 38 of the judgment see also Joined Cases18/65 and 35/65 Guttman [1966] ECR103.
12 Not used as a term of art.
13 Para 40 of the judgment.
14 Guidelines (n 2) para 2.2.
15 OJ1992 l364 p 7 (the Maritime Cabotage Regulation).
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The remit of Article 4(3),Maritime Cabotage Regulation is particularly interesting.The ECJ held that
theprovision relates to public service contractswithmaritime companies involved in regular services
to and from islands and between islands. Contracts of that type by their nature contain financial
provisions needed to cover thepublic service obligations forwhich theyprovide.TheCourt then said:
In so far as thewording of Article 4(3) . . . concerns the continuation of the contracts at issue, without
limiting the scope of that provision to certain aspects of those contracts, the financial provisions
necessary to cover the public service obligations mentioned therein are covered by the said Article
4(3). The Commission is therefore wrong to assert that that provision does no more than authorise
the possiblemaintenance of exclusive or special rights deriving from such contracts.
That said, however, the ECJ found that any aid in excess of what is necessary to cover the public
service obligations could not comewithin Article 4(3). As such, the Decision in so far as it relates to
such paymentwhich is not commensuratewith the actual cost of providing a public service obligation
must be upheld.
As regards theCommission's powers, theCourt opined that theCommission shouldnotbe criticised
for commencing proceedings, despite its uncertainty as to the status of the aid measures.
Nonetheless, it required the Commission to undertake an adequate examination of the question,
even if the outcome of that examination is a non-definitive classification of themeasure examined.16
Conclusion
The present case is a good example of howgeneral principles of procedure in State aidmight be read
and applied in a maritime context. The maritime context requires an enhanced reading of the
principles of State aid;17 indeed, as the present case demonstrates, there is, additionally, the
interplay between State aid rules and freedom of maritime services rules (such as those contained
in the Cabotage Regulation) which should be properly accommodated. The present case is also
significant in how the Court approached the matter of procedural fairness ^ especially, the right of
Member States to be heard. The Court was clearly unwilling to extend the categories of what
constitutes misuse of power but, in relation to the right to be heard, it was equally firm that the
new procedural guidance in Regulation 659/1999 was not intended to do away with such a
requirement, even in a case of an unnotified aid.That said, it should not be forgotten that with the
newGuidelines, there is in relation to a largenumber of State aidmeasures a duty18 onMember States
to update the Commission on their effects in the light of the Guidelines' objectives.19
16 Para 54 of the judgment.
17 As the Commission stresses in theGuidelines (supra n 2) at p.4 (of theOJ report),``even though as amatter of principle operating aid
should be exceptional, temporary and degressive, the Commission estimates that State aid to the European shipping industry is still
justified''.
18 Guidelines (n 2) para12.
19 Guidelines (n 2) para 2.2.
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